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This paper analyzes the relationship between income inequality and inequality of opportunities for
income acquisition in nine developed countries during the 1990s. Equality of opportunity is defined as
the situation where income distributions conditional on social origin cannot be ranked according to
stochastic dominance criteria. We measure social origin by parental education and occupation and use
the database built by Roemer et al. (2003). Stochastic dominance is assessed using nonparametric
statistical tests. Our results indicate strong disparities in the degree of equality of opportunity across
countries and a strong correlation between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity. The
U.S. and Italy show up as the most unequal countries in terms of both outcome and opportunity. At
the opposite extreme, income distributions conditional on social origin are almost the same in Scan-
dinavian countries even before any redistributive policy. We complement the ordinal comparison by
resorting to an original scalar “Gini” index of opportunities, which can be decomposed into a risk and
a return component. In our sample, inequality of opportunity is mostly driven by differences in mean
income conditional on social origin, and differences in risk compensate the return element in most
countries.
1. Introduction
As income inequality has risen to the top of the social agenda in many
countries, the need for international comparisons has become all the more press-
ing. Such comparisons provide indications on how different social systems or
policies cope with income inequality. Focusing on developed countries, recent
studies (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997, 2000) have established important differ-
ences across countries in the level of income inequality, with the U.S. and Great
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Britain being more unequal than most continental European countries, which in
turn are more unequal than the countries of Northern Europe.
Although such evidence is informative, it may be criticized for not measuring
the kind of inequalities that are relevant from a social, economic or moral per-
spective. So far, most studies have concentrated on what could be called inequality
of outcome, that is, final inequality resulting from the economic, demographic and
social process which generates the distribution of income. This concept of inequal-
ity has been used for decades and is easy to grasp. However, it does not reflect the
views of inequality that are held in the current intellectual and social debates. For
instance, influential philosophers such as Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989) or
Cohen (1989) have put the issue of personal responsibility at the forefront of the
debate on equality. According to them, economic and social policies should only
try to promote equality of opportunity. This amounts to compensate inequality
stemming from factors beyond the scope of individual responsibility (circum-
stances in the terminology introduced by Roemer), while letting, at the same time,
individuals bear the consequences of factors for which they can be held respon-
sible. This line of thought was recently introduced in the economics literature by
John Roemer in several important theoretical and empirical contributions
(Roemer, 1993, 1998; Roemer et al., 2003).
Overall, this suggests that greater attention should be paid to the role played
by personal responsibility and external factors in observed inequality. In fact, the
importance of such an analysis is enhanced by the observation that there is a priori
no reason to suspect that equality of opportunity is related to the degree of
equality of outcome. Indeed, if some countries tend to promote equality of oppor-
tunity over equality of outcome, one may observe a somewhat different ranking of
countries according to the two criteria. Furthermore, from a normative perspec-
tive, it has been emphasized (Hild and Voorhoeve, 2004) that equality of oppor-
tunity is consistent with any degree of inequality of outcome. Similar uncertainty
as to the relationship between the two notions of inequality has also been recently
expressed, from a positive point of view, in the economics literature. While some
authors have suggested that higher inequality could increase the incentives to
intergenerational mobility and consequently lead to greater equality of opportu-
nity (Checchi et al., 1999), others have also stressed that higher inequality could
raise the constraints to mobility and decrease equality of opportunity (Hassler
et al., 2000; Solon, 2004).
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Its first objective is to offer an interna-
tional comparison of inequality that echoes more closely the views on inequality
held in contemporary societies and that is consistent with modern theories of
justice. For this reason, we measure and compare the extent of equality of oppor-
tunity for income acquisition in developed economies. This complements results
already obtained regarding the comparison of inequality of disposable income.
The second objective is to examine how countries’ performance in terms of equal-
ity of opportunity relates to their degree of inequality of outcome.
Analyzing the extent of equality of opportunity for income acquisition
remains a challenging problem and only a few recent analyses have addressed it
(see Roemer et al., 2003; Bourguignon et al., 2007a). This paper rests on an origi-
nal definition of equality of opportunity developed in a companion paper (Lefranc
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et al., 2006). Together with other authors (Van de Gaer, 1993; Roemer, 1998), we
take the view that studying inequality of opportunity amounts to a comparison of
conditional income distributions. Our definition focuses on the comparison of
income distributions conditional on circumstances using stochastic dominance
tools. We complement this ordinal criterion of equality of opportunity by devel-
oping an original index of inequality of opportunity, derived from the Gini
inequality index. We further show that our inequality of opportunity index is
decomposable into two components: risk and return.
An major issue in the implementation of these measures of equality of oppor-
tunity lies in the definition and the observation of the individual circumstances that
should be taken into consideration. In this paper, we concentrate on individual
socio-economic background. Our analysis rests on a data set gathered by Roemer
et al. (2003) that conveys information on individual income and socio-economic
background in nine countries: Belgium, France, West Germany, Great Britain,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the U.S. It contains detailed infor-
mation on most sources of individual income, as well as information, albeit more
limited, on the education of the father of the respondent.
Since our data differ from those commonly used in international comparisons
of income inequality, we first check that they deliver results on inequality of
outcome that are comparable to those found in the literature, before turning to
the analysis of equality of opportunity. With respect to inequality of disposable
income, we also rank countries according to the criterion of Lorenz dominance
which is known to be more robust than using inequality indexes. In the compari-
sons of inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity we pay particular
attention to issues of statistical inference, in contrast to many empirical analyses.
To this end, we implement robust non-parametric tests of stochastic dominance
that have been developed recently (Davidson and Duclos, 2000).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definition
of equality of opportunity for income acquisition, the statistical procedure and an
index of inequality of opportunity. The data are presented in Section 3. Section 4
discusses inequality of outcome. Section 5 compares inequality of opportunity
among the nine countries and analyzes the relationship between income inequality
and inequality of opportunities. Section 6 concludes.
2. Equality of Opportunity: Definition and Measurement
When measuring inequality of outcome in empirical work, a wealth of differ-
ent approaches and indexes can be used. On the contrary, when departing from the
analysis of outcome to examine opportunity, one is first required to provide a
definition of equality of opportunity that can be implemented empirically.
2.1. Definition of Equality of Opportunity
2.1.1. Definition
Equal-opportunity theories differentiate between two fundamental sources of
inequality among individuals: on the one hand, factors outside the realm of indi-
vidual choice, usually referred to as circumstances; on the other hand, factors that
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individuals can be judged responsible for and that can be generically referred to as
effort. Following Roemer (1998) we define a type as the set of individuals with
similar circumstances. One important principle emphasized by equal-opportunity
theories is that differences in circumstances are not a morally acceptable source of
inequality. On the contrary, inequality arising from differences in effort does not
require any compensation. As a consequence, any level of inequality of outcome
can be compatible with equality of opportunity. However, when equality of oppor-
tunity prevails, no particular vector of circumstances should provide individuals
with an advantage over any other vector. This characterization allows us to derive
a condition for equality of opportunity that can be implemented empirically.
In order to derive this condition, one first needs to be more specific about the
notion of advantage that some circumstances s may provide over some other
circumstances s′. Consider the situation where individuals would be allowed to
choose their circumstances (before knowing the level of effort they will exert). In
this context, we say that s provides some advantage over s′, if all individuals prefer
the opportunity set associated with s to the one associated with s′. Consequently,
we say that equality of opportunity prevails between circumstances s and s′ if s is
not preferred to s′ by all individuals, and vice versa.
In the case of income acquisition, the opportunity set offered to an individual
with circumstances s can be summarized by the distribution of income x condi-
tional on s, denoted F(x|s). Let S denote the set of all possible vectors of circum-
stances. Choosing among elements of S amounts to choosing among income
lotteries whose distribution is given by F(x|s). Obviously, the characterization of
equality of opportunity outlined in the previous paragraph is contingent upon the
preferences used to rank these lotteries. A desirable property of the characteriza-
tion of equality of opportunity is that it holds for a sufficiently broad class of
preferences. In this paper, as in a first attempt made by Van de Gaer (1993),
stochastic dominance criteria are used to rank the opportunity sets offered by
different circumstances. We assume that individual preferences agree with the
criteria of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) and second-order stochastic
dominance (SSD). We now define FSD and SSD, for two lotteries F(x|s) and
F(x|s′) and explain what restrictions on preferences they imply.
Definition 1: The circumstances s FSD-dominate the circumstances s′
( s sFSD ′ ) iff:
F x s F x s x( ) ≤ ′( ) ∀ ∈ + .
Strict dominance (s  FSD s′) requires that for some x, strict inequality pre-
vails. This requirement has been previously proposed and discussed by Van de
Gaer et al. (2001). It is well known that under Expected Utility Theory (EUT), any
individual whose utility function is increasing in x will prefer an FSD-dominating
distribution over an FSD-dominated one. The FSD criterion determines a partial
ranking on the set of possible circumstances S.Non-dominated circumstances can
be defined for the binary relationship FSD as
P s S s S s sFSD1 = ∈ ∃ ′ ∈ ′{ }such that  .(1)
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 54, Number 4, December 2008
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © International Association for Research in Income and Wealth 2008
516
The FSD criterion is very demanding, when comparing lotteries, since it
requires the unanimity of decision makers regardless of their attitudes toward risk
(i.e. risk-loving, risk-averse, etc).
A less partial ranking can be defined using the SSD criterion, which allows us
to partially rank lotteries even when FSD is not satisfied.
Definition 2: The circumstances s SSD-dominate the circumstances s′
( s sSSD ′ ) iff:
F y s dy F y s dy x
x x( ) ≤ ′( ) ∀ ∈∫ ∫ +0 0  .(2)
In the EUT framework, any risk-averse individual whose utility function is
increasing in x will prefer an SSD-dominating distribution over an SSD-
dominated one.
Shorrocks (1983) has shown that SSD is equivalent to generalized Lorenz
(GL) dominance. Formally:
∀ ∈ ′ ⇔ ∀ ∈[ ] ( ) ≥ ( )+ ⋅( ) ⋅ ′( )x s s p GL p GL pSSD F s F s  0 1,(3)
with GLF(.|s)(p), the value of the generalized Lorenz curve at p for the distribution
F(.|s).
The set of non-dominated circumstances for  SSD, P2, may be defined in a
similar way to P1. Since SSD is a less partial criterion than FSD, we have P2 ⊆ P1.
We are now able to offer a formal definition of equality of opportunity
according to the SSD criterion. We say that equality of opportunity is achieved
when no s is dominated for the SSD criterion. Formally:
Definition 3: Equality of opportunity is achieved whenever P2 = S.
This definition is equivalent to saying that an individual choosing among all
possible circumstances is unable to rank them using the SSD criterion.
2.1.2. Discussion
Four aspects of our definition of equality of opportunity are worth
emphasizing.
First, our definition admits as a special case the equality of conditional
distributions, i.e. when for all (s, s′) in S2, and for all x, F(x|s) = F(x|s′). In such a
situation, circumstances have no impact on the distribution of income. This rep-
resents a compelling case of equality of opportunity and corresponds to the defi-
nition of equality of opportunity adopted by Roemer (1998). Indeed if the
conditional distributions are identical, so are the quantile functions. Then accord-
ing to Roemer’s interpretation, the outcome for any degree of effort measured by
the rank in the conditional income distribution is independent of circumstances. It
may be seen as a situation of strong equality of opportunity. Of course, such a
situation is unlikely to be satisfied in practice. In this perspective, our definition of
equality of opportunity is less stringent and corresponds to a weaker form of
equality of opportunity. Figure 1 summarizes the relationship between the differ-
ent definitions of equality of opportunity.
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Second, when our definition of equality of opportunity is not satisfied, it must
be the case that some circumstances s dominate some circumstances s′ according to
the SSD criterion. Schematically, this may occur for two reasons. The returns to
the lottery attached to s may be higher than those of s′, or the risk of the lottery
attached to s may be lower than that of s′. The FSD criterion only rests on the
comparison of returns, while the SSD criterion takes both returns and risk into
consideration.
From an ethical perspective, the rationale for using SSD or FSD in the
characterization of equality of opportunity depends on the nature of the factors
that affect individual outcomes. One popular model is the one developed by
Roemer where outcomes are considered the product of effort and circumstances
and individuals are implicitly assumed to know their level of effort. In this case,
individual outcome is not uncertain, the FSD criterion is sufficient and considering
the SSD criterion is, in fact, inappropriate and inconsistent. But if outcomes
remain uncertain once circumstances have been determined, resorting to the SSD
criterion is justified. This uncertainty may arise, for example, if outcomes are to
some extent determined by luck, as discussed in Van de Gaer (1993), in which case
using the SSD criterion is fully justified. In the more general setting where luck,
effort and circumstances play a role in shaping income distribution, the SSD
criterion can still be defended if the impact of effort and luck cannot be disen-
tangled in the data.1 Presumably, this is a fairly general situation since measuring
effort raises important and deep difficulties. In that case, the conditional distribu-
tion for a given type is a product of effort and luck. This risk component is the key
argument for choosing SSD over FSD as the criterion on which to anchor the
empirical definition of equality of opportunity. Accounting for risk is one of the
distinctive features of our analysis with respect to previous proposals made in
the literature.
Third, when using the SSD criterion it may be informative to assess the degree
of risk of each lottery, regardless of its return. This can be performed by comparing
the conditional distributions centered on their mean, using the standard Lorenz
criterion. Let LF(.|s) (p) denote the value of the Lorenz curve at p for the distribution
F(.|s), the s lottery will be said to be less risky than that of s′ if:
1See Lefranc et al. (2006) for more developments.
Figure 1. Three Definitions of Equality of Opportunity
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∀ ∈[ ] ( ) ≥ ( )
⋅( ) ⋅ ′( )p L p L pF s F s0 1, , .
Fourth, the definition of equality of opportunity, either strong or weak, is
contingent on the definition of the relevant circumstances. However, given data
limitations, it is unlikely that all circumstances will, in practice, be observable. Any
concept of equality of opportunity has to cope with incomplete information. One
may wonder if incomplete observation of the relevant circumstances may distort
the empirical assessment of equality of opportunity. We address this issue in two
companion papers (Lefranc et al., 2004, 2006) and show that the two concepts of
equality of opportunity brought out here are fairly robust to an incomplete
description of the circumstances.
2.2. Measurement
2.2.1. Stochastic Dominance Tests
The condition developed in the previous section suggests a natural empirical
test to assess whether equality of opportunity prevails: first, estimate the condi-
tional income distributions associated with observed circumstances and then
compare these distributions using second-order stochastic dominance tools.
When comparing two GL curves, three situations can occur: (a) one curve lies
above the other; (b) the two curves intersect; (c) the two curves are identical. Our
definition implies that equality of opportunity prevails in case (b) or in case (c).
It is violated in case (a). Case (c) corresponds to strong equality of opportunity.
In practice, we estimate the conditional income distributions and we perform
non-parametric stochastic dominance tests at the second order. Our tests imple-
ment the procedure developed in Davidson and Duclos (2000) and are presented
in the Appendix.
For two sub-populations A and B, we perform the following two tests
independently: (1) we test the null hypothesis of equality of the distributions
of A and B; (2) we test the null of SSD of distribution A over B and vice
versa.
If we fail to reject the null of test (1), we conclude that there is strong equality
of opportunity between A and B and only in that case. If test (2) accepts domi-
nance of one distribution over the other but not the other way round (e.g.
A BSSD and B ASSD ) we conclude that equality of opportunity is violated. It
may occur that we reject the null of test (1) and that test (2) concludes that the two
distributions dominate each other (e.g. A BSSD and B ASSD ). In that case,
we give priority to the result of test (1) since it is a more powerful test of equality
of distributions for any significance level. Hence, in that case, we conclude that
strong equality of opportunity is rejected but that equality of opportunity, as
defined by Definition 3, is not rejected.
2.2.2. Inequality of Opportunity Index
One drawback of an ordinal characterization of equality of opportunity is
that it does not allow us to rank situations in which equality of opportunity is
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rejected. At the cost of a loss of generality, it is also possible to build an index
allowing us to measure the degree of inequality of opportunity.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to wonder what minimal properties
such an index must satisfy. Borrowing from the literature on inequality indexes
(see for instance, Sen, 1997), it seems reasonable to require the following
properties.
(1) Within-type Anonymity. The index must be invariant to any permutation
of two individuals with similar circumstances.
(2) Between-type Pigou-Dalton Transfers Principle. Consider two circum-
stances s and s′ such that the first one dominates the second one according
to SSD. The index must decrease if we perform any transfer from an
s-type individual to an s′-type individual such that (a) in the ex ante
distribution, the first individual is richer than the second individual, and
(b) in the ex post distribution, the first-type individual is not poorer than
the second-type individual.
(3) Normalization. If the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) corre-
sponding to all circumstances are identical, then the index must be equal
to 0.
(4) Principle of Population. The index is invariant to a replication of the
population.
(5) Scale Invariance. The index is invariant to a multiplication of all incomes
by a positive scalar.
This list of properties defines a large class of indexes of equality of oppor-
tunity. Among it, we construct and use a particular index, whose appeal is its
relation to the most popular index of inequality, the Gini index.
Our proposition is inspired from the approach of Van de Gaer (1993) and
Ooghe et al. (2007). It focuses on the opportunity sets to which people have access
and tries to make these sets as equal as possible. First we need to define a measure
of the opportunities offered to individuals with given circumstances (a type in
Roemer’s terminology) in the space of lotteries. Here we borrow from the litera-
ture on the measurement of opportunity sets (see Peragine (1999) for a survey). We
measure the feasible opportunity of a given lottery by the area under its GL curve.
Indeed, any lottery dominated according to the GL criterion belongs to this set. In
an influential contribution to the measurement of opportunity, Pattanaik and Xu
(1990) axiomatized the cardinal of a discrete set as a measure of opportunity.
Among the axioms introduced by the authors, the monotonicity property reads as
follows. Given an opportunity set A and an opportunity y which does not belong
to A, A  y offers more opportunity than A. When the opportunity set is continu-
ous, counting elements of the opportunity set does not make sense any more. A
natural extension is to consider the area below the opportunity set as a cardinal
measure of opportunity; for instance, Bensaid and Fleurbaey (2003) suggested this
measure when the opportunity set is a budget set.
Now, let us rank all circumstances according to twice the area under the GL
curve, starting from the smallest one. For type s, whose population share is ps, this
area is equal to
μs sG1−( ),(4)
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with m denoting the mean and the G the Gini coefficient.2 The Gini opportunity
(GO) index is defined by:
GO x p p G Gi j j j i i
j ii
k
( ) = −( )− −( )( )
>=
∑∑1 1 1
1μ
μ μ .(5)
It computes the weighted sum of all the differences between areas of opportu-
nity sets. Dividing by the mean income of the entire population mmakes this index
independent of the wealth of the society. This index can be viewed as an extension
of the Gini coefficient since, when there are as many circumstances s as individuals,
GO is equal to the Gini coefficient, i.e.:
G x
n
x xj i
j ii
n
( ) = −( )
>=
∑∑12
1μ
.(6)
Therefore the GO index takes its value between 0 and 1. Comparison of equations
(5) and (6) shows thatGO(x)  G(x) and that the Gini opportunity index increases
with the number of types. An advantage of this index is that it is closely related to
the definition of equality of opportunity based on GL curves.
2.2.3. A Decomposition Between a Risk and Return Component
As shown by equation (4), the opportunity set of a type is the product of two
components: a return component, equal to the average income ms, and a risk
component, 1 - Gs which depends on within-type inequality. These two compo-
nents interact in a multiplicative way which makes the problem of decomposition
different from the usual case of decomposing income inequality by additive factor
components. We propose a decomposition of the GO index between a return
component and a risk component. The two components are computed without
making a reranking of types, namely the ranking of types remains that according
to twice the area under the GL curve.
Let us define the pure return component GOpt(x) as the value of the GO
coefficient when within-type income inequality is fully erased.
GO x p ppt i j j i
j ii
k
( ) = −( )
>=
∑∑1
1μ
μ μ .
Van de Gaer (1993) proposed use of the inequality of expected conditional
outcomes as a measure of inequality of opportunity. We define the pure risk
component GOpr(x) as the value of the GO coefficient if between-type inequality of
per capita income is removed.
GO x p p G G p p G Gpr i j j i
j ii
k
i j i j
j ii
( ) = −( )− −( )( ) = −( )
>= >=
∑∑ ∑1 1 1
1 1μ
μ
k∑ .
2Yitzhaki (1979) already proposed m(1 - G) as a measure of satisfaction of the society, here being
the society made up of the individuals of common circumstances.
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A decomposition involving both pure contributions reads
GO x GO x GO x p p G Gpt pr i j i i j j
j ii
k
( ) = ( ) + ( ) + −( ) − −( )( )
>=
∑∑1
1μ
μ μ μ μ ,(7)
where the third term is an interaction term between the return and risk components
not too easy to interpret.
The fact that there is no reranking before computing GOpt(x) and GOpr(x)
has one important consequence. Both indexes may take negative values. It may
arise for GOpt(x) if the per capita income for some top group is smaller than that
for some bottom group. If the ranking of the types according to the GL domi-
nance test is not ambiguous, it should not arise since GL dominance implies
mean dominance. So in practice, the GOpt(x) will be positive in general and the
absence of reranking does not matter. It is not the case for the GOpr(x) which
may be negative if some bottom type is less risky than some top type. As a
matter of fact, GOpr(x) incorporates a correlation between risk and mean income
defined at the type level. A positive value indicates that on average the top types
are less risky than the other types and a negative value the opposite. So the
interest of the risk contribution is to assess whether the risk element strengthens
or reduces the return element in measuring the inequality of opportunity of
social lotteries.
A potential shortcoming of decomposition (7) is that the interaction term can
be large in practice. It is possible to provide an exact decomposition of the GO
index by resorting to an alternative definition of the risk and return components.
To understand the construction of the alternative decomposition, it is important to
note that the GO index is defined by a series of pairwise comparisons of GL curves
for all possible (ordered) pairs. In the previous decomposition, the return and risk
components were respectively defined by equalizing the return across all types and
setting risk equal to zero for all types. In the alternative decomposition the defi-
nition of the risk and return components assumes that return or risk have only
been equalized pairwise, for all possible pairs of types.
Specifically, the contribution of between-type inequality of returns to the
inequality of opportunity, GOt(x), is equal to the value of the GO index where for
each pairwise comparison, within-type inequality has been equalized and set to the
arithmetic mean of the Gini coefficient of the two types. Hence, GOet(x) is defined
by
GO x p p
G G
et i j j i
i j
j ii
k
( ) = −( ) − +⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
>=
∑∑1 1 21μ μ μ .
It is important to note that GOet(x) differs from the pure return term because
within-type inequality has not been erased but equalized pairwise.
The alternative risk component, GOer, is equal to the value of the GO index
when between-type inequality has been equalized in each pairwise comparison.
That is, for all pairs (i, j), it is assumed that the mean income of each type is equal
to the arithmetic mean income of the two groups. The only source of inequality of
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opportunity among the two types comes from differences in within-type inequality.
Formally, we have:
GO x p p G Ger i j
j i
j i
j ii
k
( ) = +⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ −( )− −( )( )
>=
∑∑1 2 1 11μ
μ μ
.
In the same way GOer(x) is not a pure risk term since average income for each
group may still differ in the hypothetical distribution used to define GOer(x).
One should note that each of the two contributions GOet(x) and GOer(x)
includes some part of the interaction terms in (8). Hence, their interpretation is not
as straightforward as for the two pure terms. But the advantage is that the two
contributions sum up to the total inequality of opportunity measured by the Gini
index of inequality of opportunity and it is simple arithmetics to prove that:
GO x GO x GO xet er( ) = ( ) + ( ).(8)
3. Data Description
Data requirements for comparing inequality of opportunity for income acqui-
sition across countries turn out to be even more stringent than for comparing
inequality of outcome. Indeed, the reliability of the empirical analysis calls not
only for comparable measures of individual disposable income. It also requires
that individual background be measured in a comparable and homogeneous way
across countries.
3.1. Data Sets and Sample Selection
The data used in the empirical analysis come from household surveys and
micro-economic administrative data for nine countries: Belgium, France, West
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S.
Data were collected during the first half of the 1990s. For each country, the data
sets include information on individual and household income, both pre-and post-
fisc, as well as information on individual family background. As discussed below,
the latter information will be used to identify individual circumstances.
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the data sets used for each
country. These data were put together by national experts for the purpose
of a previous international comparison of income inequality and equality of
opportunity, the results of which were presented in Roemer et al. (2003).3
Although the national data sets were collected independently, much effort was
expended to ensure the greatest degree of ex post comparability across countries of
the different variables used in the analysis.
Needless to say, providing comparable data for a large number of countries
represents a challenging task. The major advantage of the data used in this article,
over harmonized micro-economic income data sets often used in comparative
3For providing access to the data, we are grateful toMarx (Belgium data), Wagner (German data),
Jenkins (British data), Colombino (Italian data), Pommer (Dutch data), Aaberge (Norwegian data),
Fritzell (Swedish data), and Page and Roemer (U.S. data).
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research (e.g. the Luxembourg Income Study, the OECD, the European Commu-
nity Household Panel (ECHP) or the World Bank data sets4) is that it provides
information on individual circumstances, besides information on individual
income. Hence, being able to relate individual income to individual circumstances
in nine developed economies makes the data set used here extremely valuable. One
further advantage of these data is that they include information on Sweden and the
Netherlands, two countries that are often absent from international comparisons
of income inequality.
Samples used in the rest of the paper are restricted to male heads of house-
holds aged 25–40 at the time of the survey (25–50 in West Germany). This age
interval is relatively narrow, so we do not expect differences in the age composition
across countries to have a strong impact on our results. Further restricting our
sample to a narrower age interval would lead to sample sizes that would be too
small to perform robust dominance analysis. One possible limitation of our age
restriction is that it leads to sample individuals relatively early in their lifecycle.
Since the returns to experience are positively corrrelated with education and,
consequently, with social background, this could lead to understatement of the
extent of inequality of lifetime opportunities (see for instance, Grawe, 2006). For
this reason, the estimates of the extent of inequality of opportunity presented here
should be seen as a lower bound.
3.2. Main Variables
3.2.1. Individual Circumstances
Defining the exact set of individual circumstances is a deep and debatable
question. Besides, in empirical work, observing this entire set is clearly out of
reach. In this paper, we examine the dependence of individual opportunity on a
restricted set of circumstances, namely circumstances relating to individual social
origin, measured by parental education or occupation.
4See Gottschalk et al. (2000) for an analysis of income inequality from the LIS data, OECD (1998)
for OECD data, and Deininger and Squire (1996) for a presentation of the World Bank data. However,
these normalized data sets are not immune to statistical problem. See, among others, Atkinson and
Brandolini (2001) and Galbraith and Kum (2005) for an assessment.
TABLE 1
Databases
Year Obs.
Belgium PSBH Panel survey of Belgian households 1992 1065
France BdF French household survey 1994 2762
Great Britain BHPS British household panel survey 1991 1020
West Germany GSOEP German socio-economic panel 1994 1112
Italy SHIW Italian survey of household income and wealth 1993 1433
Netherlands AVO Dutch facilities use survey 1995 1748
Norway SLL Norwegian survey of level of living 1995 778
Sweden LNU Swedish level of living survey 1991 819
U.S. PSID Panel study of income dynamics 1991 1131
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Of course, social origin may influence individual outcomes through a variety
of channels such as economic or genetic inheritance, or the transmission of pref-
erences. Our interest lies solely in determining the extent to which social back-
ground influences individual opportunity sets. Identifying these different channels
is not the topic of this paper. In fact, from the point of view of equality of
opportunity, most authors would agree that substantive (as opposed to formal)
equality of opportunity requires compensating the influence of social origin on
individual outcomes, regardless of the channel through which it operates, as social
origin lies beyond individual responsibility and choice (see for instance, Dworkin,
1981; Arneson, 1989; Roemer, 1993). Nevertheless, we recognize that this egali-
tarian principle may conflict with other social objectives or ethical values. For
instance, if the influence of social origin is driven by the intergenerational trans-
mission of talent, equality of opportunity will go against allocative efficiency. In
the light of recent philosophical debates, it can also be argued, from a normative
point of view, that the above notion of equality of opportunity may contradict
other ethical principles such as self-ownership and freedom. For instance, the
influence of social origin may be driven by the genetic transmission of individual
traits. In this case, the self-ownership principle claims that differences of outcome
due to such constitutive traits should not be compensated (see for instance,
Vallentyne, 1997). In our view, these two criticisms do not challenge the consis-
tency of the above notion of equality of opportunity or dispute the relevance of the
comparison undertaken here. But they suggest that there may be a trade-off
between different social and ethical objectives. Admittedly, this should be inves-
tigated empirically using a more detailed description of the individual circum-
stances. However, the data at our disposal prevent us from undertaking such an
analysis of the different channels at work. But it is often the case that international
comparisons are made at this price.
For most countries in our data, individual social background is measured by
the level of education of the father. The only two exceptions are France and Great
Britain, for which we only observe the occupational group of the father. For each
country, we partition our sample in three categories, Ed1 to Ed3, where Ed3 denotes
(a priori) the most advantaged social background. When using father’s education,
we account for specificities of national educational systems. When using informa-
tion on father’s social group the classification is as follows: for France, (1) farmers
and manual workers, (2) clerks, and (3) professionals and self-employed workers;
for Great Britain, (1) farmers and unskilled manual workers, (2) clerks and skilled
manual workers, and (3) professionals and self-employed workers.5
Table 2 presents the classification of social background in each country, as
well as the number of observations in each category. In partitioning our samples
according to social background, two constraints had to be taken into account:
first, the need for sub-samples large enough to allow for the estimation of condi-
tional income distributions; second, the requirement of a meaningful partitioning,
with respect to each country’s educational and social structure. As a consequence
of these two constraints, the comparability of our classification across countries
5For the French sample it is the father’s occupational group when the individual was 16. In Great
Britain it is the occupational group when he was 14.
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remains imperfect. In particular, one should be aware of differences in the relative
size of each group across countries.6 In France, Great Britain, the Netherlands,
Norway and the U.S., each group represents between one quarter and one half of
the overall population. This does not hold for Belgium, West Germany, Italy and
Sweden, where one group represents less than one fifth of the overall population.
More specifically, the distribution of the population among the three types seems
particularly unbalanced for West Germany. It may induce a downward bias for
inequality of opportunity in this country and this should be kept in mind when
analyzing the extent of equality of opportunity in Section 5.7
3.2.2. Income
We focus on two measures of individual income: gross pre-fisc annual house-
hold income and net disposable annual household income.8 Analyzing both
income measures allows us to examine the impact of fiscal redistribution on
inequality of outcomes and opportunity.
Since household income (both pre- and post-fisc) incorporates a variety of
different income sources, similar sources should be taken into account for each
country in order to ensure cross-country data comparability. Gross pre-fisc income
includes labor income (from both salaried and self-employed workers) and asset
income. The only exception is Belgium for which neither self-employment nor
6There are also differences in the absolute size of each sub-sample, and this could hinder the
comparability of our tests across countries. In order to assess the influence of the size of sample, we
have drawn independent random sub-samples for each country of the same size as the smallest sample.
It did not change any result.
7For a statistical appraisal of the consequences of errors in the conditioning variable, see O’Neill
et al. (2007).
8In most countries, taxes and employee social security contributions are simulated. Differences
across countries regarding the share of social security spending financed by means of employer con-
tribution, employee contribution or income tax are likely to reduce the comparability across countries
of gross pre-fisc income levels. Comparison of disposable income distributions across countries does
not raise similar concerns.
TABLE 2
Description of Samples
Observations Years of Education
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Belgium 423 338 165 <10 10–12 >12
France 1272 699 792 – – –
Great Britain 388 301 273 – – –
West Germany 856 142 114 <10 10–13 >13
Italy 268 724 441 <5 5–7 >7
Netherlands 478 784 486 <6 6–9 >9
Norway 465 170 143 <9 9–11 >11
Sweden 411 228 178 <8 8–11 >11
U.S. 386 373 372 <12 12 >12
Notes: Number of observations and number of years of educa-
tion of the parents for the different sub-samples.
–, information about the occupational group of the parents has
been used.
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capital income is available. Using data for France, a country that is close in
economic terms to Belgium, we performed a sensitivity analysis and conclude that
excluding self-employed individuals has a minor impact on measured inequality of
both outcome and opportunity. The lack of capital income leads to an underesti-
mation of inequality and inequality of opportunity. However, it is well known that
capital income is poorly reported in many household surveys.
Labor income is measured gross of any employee share of social security
contributions. Taxes taken into account are income tax as well as housing and
property taxes. Transfers include unemployment benefits, all social security ben-
efits (related to sickness, disability, maternity, poverty, etc), pensions, child or
family allowances and means-tested benefits. Details of income sources taken into
account, for each country are provided in Appendix Table A1. To account for
differences in household size, income is normalized using the OECD equivalence
scale. Household income is divided by the square root of the number of household
members. Since we do not want cross-country differences in income per capita to
influence our comparison of inequality of outcome and opportunity, for each
country we divide household income by the country’s mean household income.
4. Inequality of Outcome
Before analyzing equality of opportunity, we first compare the extent of
inequality of outcome in the countries of our sample. Several papers have already
compared the extent of income inequality across countries, using harmonized data.
The interest of the comparison undertaken here is twofold. First, it can be seen as
a test of the validity of the data used in this paper. In fact, our results broadly
concur with those of previous analysis. Second, while most comparative papers
have concentrated on the analysis of inequality indexes, we also compare relative
inequality across countries using the Lorenz dominance criterion. The interest of
this criterion lies in its greater generality. We also pay particular attention to issues
of statistical inference and implement Lorenz dominance tests.9 We first discuss the
ranking of countries that emerges from these tests before performing a comparison
with the results of other studies based on inequality indexes.
4.1. Lorenz Dominance Tests
One way to get a first picture of income inequality in the nine countries is to
compare the shape of the income densities. The densities are estimated logarith-
mically using kernel estimation.10 Figure 2 gives the densities of the distribution of
disposable income centered around their means. The American distribution is
reproduced on each graph to make comparisons easier.
The comparison of these densities reveals important differences across coun-
tries in the distribution of income. The contrast between Sweden and the U.S. is
striking, with a fairly symmetric distribution concentrated around its mean for the
first one and a strong right skew for the second one. The differences between other
European distributions and the American one are less sharp. Norway shares with
9The methodology of these tests is presented in the appendix.
10A Gaussian adaptative bandwidth kernel estimator has been used.
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Sweden a large mode but its distribution is less concentrated than the Swedish one.
The case of Belgium seems to be fairly similar to these two Nordic countries. The
shape of the distribution in the Netherlands, France and Germany is comparable
and lies in an intermediate position between Sweden and the U.S. The British
density is closer to the American one than to the distribution in continental
Europe, with the exception of Italy. This last country displays a distribution fairly
close to the American and British ones.
To obtain a more precise picture of inequality we consider Lorenz curves.
Figure 3 shows Lorenz curves for disposable income in each country. As for income
densities, the American curve is represented on each graph. Their analysis corrobo-
rates our previous comments. In the top left panel, it is apparent that the Belgian
Lorenz curve is above the French curve, which itself dominates the U.S. one. In the
top right panel, it can be seen that the Netherlands and West Germany have a
similar level of inequality. The bottom left panel confirms that inequality is pretty
much the same in Great Britain, the U.S. and Italy. Finally, in the bottom right
panel, the significant gap between Scandinavian countries and the U.S. is apparent.
This visual inspection is confirmed by the results of the Lorenz dominance
tests for each pairwise comparison (Table 3). These results do not lead to a com-
plete ranking of the countries. However, three groups of three countries emerge
from these tests. The first group consists of Sweden, Norway and Belgium. The
second one includes France, West Germany and the Netherlands. The third one is
composed of Great Britain, Italy and the U.S. The hierarchy between the three
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Figure 2. Disposable Income Densities Estimated by Kernel
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Figure 3. Lorenz Curves for Disposable Income
TABLE 3
Inequality of Outcome: Lorenz Dominance Tests
Sweden Norway Belgium France W. Germ Nether Gt Britain Italy U.S.
Sweden – ? ? > > > > > >
Norway – – ? > > > > > >
Belgium – – – > > > > > >
France – – – – = = > > >
W. Germ – – – – – < > > >
Nether – – – – – – > > >
Gt Britain – – – – – – – = =
Italy – – – – – – – – ?
U.S. – – – – – – – – –
Notes: The symbols read as follows:
> The row dominates the column.
< The row is dominated by the column.
= Lorenz curves are identical.
? Lorenz curves are non-comparable.
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groups is obvious. All countries in the first group Lorenz-dominate the countries
of the second and third groups; the countries of the second group Lorenz-
dominate the countries of the third one. The within-group ranking is less clear.
Within the first group, any pairwise comparison leads to an indeterminacy. The
apparently low level of inequality in Belgium may partly be ascribed to the fact
that our Belgian data do not take asset income into account. Within the second
and third groups, for each pairwise comparison, dominance tests conclude to
either equality or crossing of the Lorenz curves, except for the comparison between
the Netherlands and West Germany, for which the latter dominates the former.
4.2. Comparison with Other Studies
In order to assess the reliability of our data, we now compare our results to
those obtained in other studies, using harmonized income data. To this end, we
estimate scalar indexes of relative inequality in the nine countries. Estimates are
reported in Table A2, with bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. For obvious
reasons, inequality indexes (Gini, CV) and inter-quantile ratios presented in
Table A2 suggest a ranking of countries that is similar to the one established in the
previous section. Within-group differences in inequality indexes are not statisti-
cally significant, while between-groups differences are.
One natural benchmark to gauge the reliability of our income data is to
compare our results to those obtained in Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, 2000),
using data from the Luxembourg Income Study for the early 1990s. Three points
should be emphasized. First, our relative ranking of countries is to a large extent
consistent with the results presented in their studies. Second, for most countries,
our estimates of inequality indexes are lower than those reported in their studies.
This may largely reflect differences in sample selection rules, and in particular the
fact that we have restricted our samples to a narrower age interval.11 Third, two
noteworthy differences appear regarding the level of inequality and the ranking of
two countries: France and Italy. In our data the former appears less unequal and
the latter more unequal than in Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), both in absolute
and relative terms.12 Regarding France, the difference can be explained by the fact
that we use data from 1994, compared with 1989 or 1984 in their study. Moreover,
Hourriez et al. (2001) demonstrate that disposable income inequality decreases
slightly between these dates. Regarding Italy, their data refer to 1991, a year for
which measured inequality is markedly lower than in adjacent years, in particular
1993, the year used in our study. For Italy as well as more generally, our results
seem close to those of other studies, in terms of both levels of inequality and
ranking of the countries: Bertola et al. (2001) find a Gini of 0.348 for disposable
income with LIS data in 1994, and rank Italy among the more unequal countries
in Europe. The same conclusion emerges from Atkinson (1996), OECD (1998) and
Smeeding et al. (2000), who establish an overall ranking similar to ours. Sastre and
Trannoy (2001) find very similar results for Gini indexes using LIS data.
11For most countries, our samples are restricted to household whose head is aged 25 to 40, while
their sample includes all non-institutionalized households.
12According to the value of Gini coefficients displayed in Gottschalk and Smeeding’s study, France
ranks third with a Gini of 0.32 after the U.S. (0.36) and Great Britain (0.34). In our data income
inequality is larger in Italy and the Netherlands than in France. See Table A2.
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Overall, our results closely mimic those obtained in various sources our data,
which suggests that we should be reasonably confident in the validity of our
income data for international comparisons of inequality. We now turn to the
analysis of inequality of opportunity.
5. Equality of Opportunity for Income Acquisition
The above conclusions for inequality of outcomes may not prevail for
inequality of opportunity. In fact, in a country with limited inequality of oppor-
tunity, there can still be important differences in individual success (hence impor-
tant inequality of outcome) if individuals exert very heterogeneous effort levels.
Conversely, a low level of inequality of outcomes is compatible with important
differences according to social origin. We first test for equality of opportunity and
then analyze differences in the return and risk of income lotteries conditional on
social origin. Lastly, using our index of inequality of opportunity, we examine how
countries’ performance in terms of equality of opportunity compares to their
ranking in terms of overall inequality.
5.1. Dominance Tests
Figure 4 draws the conditional distributions for primary and disposable
income in each country. Again, for each country, income is expressed as a fraction
of the country’s mean income. The results are then dimension-free and fully
comparable to the results obtained for inequality of outcome. Not surprisingly,
having more educated parents is associated with a higher level of income. Indeed
in every country but Norway, Sweden and West Germany, the CDF for individu-
als from more privileged origin is always below the CDFs for individuals coming
from the two less privileged social backgrounds.
These graphs also reveal important differences between countries in the mag-
nitude of the advantage conferred by more privileged backgrounds over less privi-
leged ones. Intuitively, this advantage corresponds to the gap between the CDFs
corresponding to the different social backgrounds. As apparent from these graphs,
this distance varies strongly from one country to another. For Sweden, the three
conditional distributions for Ed1 to Ed3 are strikingly close, suggesting that differ-
ences in social background translate into very small differences in income. The
same holds true, to a lesser extent, in Norway where the gap between the income
distributions of the different backgrounds is rather modest.
This stands in marked contrast with the situation in Italy and the U.S. where
the gap between the three distributions is important. In Great Britain, the advan-
tage conferred to the most privileged group is still quite large, but the gap between
the second most privileged group is less wide than in the U.S. and Italian cases.
Moreover, the income distributions of groups Ed1 and Ed2 are closer together than
in Italy and the U.S., suggesting more equality of opportunity in this country at the
bottom of the social ladder.
The rest of the countries in our data (Belgium, France, Germany and the
Netherlands) exhibit an intermediate degree of inequality of opportunity. There
are significant differences in the income distributions offered to individuals
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Figure 4. Income Distributions Conditional on Social Background
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Figure 4. Continued
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according to their social background. However, the distance between these distri-
butions is smaller than in Italy and the U.S. It should also be noted that in the
former group of countries, especially in Belgium, inequality of opportunity is more
pronounced at the bottom of the social hierarchy, to the extent that the gap
between the distributions of groups Ed1 and Ed2 is larger than the distance between
Ed2 and Ed3. This contrasts with the situation in Italy, Great Britain and the U.S.
However, these differences in the locus of inequality of opportunity may partly
reflect differences in the classification used to partition our sample according to
social background rather than national specificities.
Whether equality of opportunity prevails can be formally assessed using
stochastic dominance tests. To complement visual inspections in terms of FSD
offered by Figure 4, the results according to SSD appear in Table 4.13 In fact, in
almost all cases dominance results are also obtained for FSD, except mostly for
Germany.14 The only country in which our equality of opportunity criterion is
satisfied for all groups is Sweden. In fact, this country exhibits a situation
described previously as strong equality of opportunity, as the pairwise tests
suggest equality of the three conditional distributions. It should also be stressed
that this strong requirement holds for both primary and disposable income.
In all other countries, according to our definition, equality of opportunity
does not prevail. There exists at least one social background whose income distri-
bution is dominated by that of another group. It is nevertheless possible to rank
these countries according to the number of times the statistical tests conclude to
dominance in the three pairwise comparisons. In this respect, when focusing on
comparisons of disposable income, West Germany is the second least unequal (in
terms of opportunity) since equality prevails in one case and non-comparability in
two other cases. Great Britain, Belgium and Norway come next with two cases of
dominance and one equality.
Lastly, in France, Italy, the Netherlands and the U.S., the three tests conclude
to dominance at the second order, indicating that the hierarchy of social back-
grounds apparent on the graphs of the CDFs is indeed very robust.
In all countries but two, Belgium and West Germany, the results of the
dominance tests for primary income are identical to the results for disposable
income. This can be interpreted as the weak impact of redistributive policy on
equality of opportunity as it is measured here. Hence redistributive policy is not
able to fully neutralize the effect of the initial background on the economic success
of the next generation. Nevertheless Figure 4 reveals that redistributive policy
tends to partially offset the impact of social origin on individual income: in all
countries the CDFs for primary income, conditional on social background, are
always further apart than the CDFs for disposable income.
13One can wonder if the differences in results from a country to another come from the differences
in sample size. We have checked that the results exhibited in Table 4 are robust to differences in sample
size. For instance, the results for France are the same when its samples are downsized to Norway’s
figures.
14The only other exception is the comparison between Ed2 and Ed3 which results in non-
comparability at the first order in the Netherlands.
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5.2. Risk and Return of the Social Lotteries
Using standard tools in risk theory, it is also possible to compare the income
lotteries attached to different social backgrounds in terms of their return and risk.
Since for most countries, the tests conclude to first-order stochastics among social
backgrounds, we already know that the expected income (i.e. the return) is usually
larger for the more favored social background. However, whether the lotteries
offered to the most advantaged type are also less risky remains an open question.
TABLE 4
Stochastic Dominance Tests
Belgium France
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 – <2 <2 – <2 <2 – <2 <2 – <2 <2
Ed2 – – ? – – = – – <2 – – <2
Ed3 – – – – – – – – – – – –
Great Britain West Germany
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 – = <2 – = <2 – ? <2 – ? ?
Ed2 – – <2 – – <2 – – = – – =
Ed3 – – – – – – – – – – – –
Italy Netherlands
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 – <2 <2 – <2 <2 – <2 <2 – <2 <2
Ed2 – – <2 – – <2 – – <2 – – <2
Ed3 – – – – – – – – – – – –
Norway Sweden
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 – <2 <2 – <2 <2 – = = – = =
Ed2 – – = – – = – – = – – =
Ed3 – – – – – – – – – – – –
U.S.
Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 – <2 <2 – <2 <2
Ed2 – – <2 – – <2
Ed3 – – – – – –
Notes: The symbols read as follows
<2 The row is dominated by the column at the second order of stochastic dominance.
= Equality of the CDF at the second order.
? CDFs are not comparable at the second order.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 54, Number 4, December 2008
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © International Association for Research in Income and Wealth 2008
535
5.2.1. An Almost Equal Risk of Conditional Lotteries
To focus solely on risk, we examine conditional distributions centered around
their means, and we draw Lorenz curves of these centered distributions. Compar-
ing two distributions, if the Lorenz curve of the first distribution is above the
Lorenz curve of the other, then the first distribution will be preferred by all
risk-averse individuals, whatever their degree of risk-aversion. Table 5 contains
TABLE 5
Inequality of Opportunity: Lorenz Dominance Tests
Belgium France
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 – ? = – = = – = = – = >
Ed2 – – = – – = – – = – – >
Ed3 – – – – – – – – – – – –
Great Britain West Germany
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 – = = – > = – = = – = >
Ed2 – – < – – < – – = – – =
Ed3 – – – – – – – – – – – –
Italy Netherlands
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 – < < – ? < – = < – = ?
Ed2 – – = – – = – – < – – <
Ed3 – – – – – – – – – – – –
Norway Sweden
Primary Income Disposable Income Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 – < ? – = > – = = – = =
Ed2 – – ? – – > – – = – – =
Ed3 – – – – – – – – – – – –
U.S.
Primary Income Disposable Income
Ed1 Ed2 Ed3 Ed1 Ed2 Ed3
Ed1 – = = – ? =
Ed2 – – = – – =
Ed3 – – – – – –
Notes: The symbols read as follows:
< The row is dominated by the column.
> The row dominates the column.
= Lorenz curves are identical.
? Lorenz curves are non-comparable.
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the results of the Lorenz dominance tests. The sequence of tests is similar to the one
used for stochastic dominance.
These results suggest that the degree of risk15 of the income lotteries associated
with social background tends to be rather similar. For most countries, the Lorenz
curves of the different types are very close, especially for disposable income.
Regarding the tests, there is a surprisingly large proportion of pairwise comparisons
for which we conclude to the equality of the Lorenz curves: 18 of 27 times for
primary income and 15 of 27 times for disposable income. Even if we exclude all
cases inwhich the uncentered distributions are already equal, we conclude that there
is equality of the Lorenz curves in about half of the cases. In each country there is at
least one pairwise disposable income comparison for which equality holds.
All three conditional distributions display the same degree of risk in four
countries for primary income (France, West Germany, Sweden and the U.S.) and
two countries for disposable income (Sweden and Belgium). For these countries,
the equality of risks suggests that the impact of the family background may simply
be captured by a scale parameter. As a first approximation, in these countries, the
distribution of income conditional on social background, takes the following
multiplicative form:
x E x sis i= ( )ε(9)
where xis denotes the income of individual i with social background s, E(x|s) is the
expectation of income conditional on s, and ei is a random term independent of
social background. It should be stressed that equality in the degree of risk of the
different distributions is an interesting special case where the ranking of the
distributions can be achieved based solely on a comparison of the returns.
When equality of risks does not hold, the tests conclude to the crossing of the
Lorenz curves in one fourth of the cases. When the conditional Lorenz curves can
be ranked, the table indicates that less privileged backgrounds face more risky
income lotteries than more privileged ones in all cases for primary income, but
only in one third of the cases for disposable income. This indicates that redistribu-
tive policies tend to lower the risk of the worst social lotteries. For instance, France
faces a situation of perfect equality of risk in primary income, but after income tax
and transfers, the lottery corresponding to the more privileged type is riskier than
the other two. Suppose that we are ready to assume, following Roemer, that the
dispersion of incomes within a type is the result of effort only. Then a policy aimed
solely at reducing inequality of opportunity should leave the level of risk
unchanged. Under this assumption, which is admittedly quite strong, we conclude
that the French redistributive policies are not solely motivated by equality of
opportunity as defined by Roemer.
5.2.2. Inequality of Return and Inequality of Risk
So far our appraisal of risk relies on ordinal comparisons. We now implement
our cardinal measure, the GO index, and its decompositions (7) and (8) to provide
15Two types of inequalities are mixed up in this measure of the degree of risk: transitory income
fluctuations and differences in permanent income among individuals of similar social origin.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 54, Number 4, December 2008
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © International Association for Research in Income and Wealth 2008
537
additional empirical evidence, though at the price of lower robustness. Table 6
gives the values of the contributions of the return and the risk component accord-
ing both decompositions.
It clearly appears that the magnitude of the risk contribution is similar for the
two decompositions. The interaction term is absorbed by the return term in the
exact decomposition (8). Since the interaction term is quite large (between 20 and
45 percent in absolute value of the GO index) our comments will focus on the exact
decomposition.
In the making of inequality of opportunity, inequality of returns stands out
as the dominant force. This comes as no surprise in view of the previous ordinal
analysis. What is more interesting is that in two thirds of the countries, the risk
contribution is negative, meaning that risk is lower in less privileged types. In
these countries, inequality of risk mitigates inequality of opportunity and this
effect is quite strong in France, West Germany and Norway. The opposite
occurs in Belgium, Italy and the U.S. where risk inequality exacerbates inequal-
ity of opportunity. When assessing the robustness of this finding, one should
however keep in mind the results of the risk dominance tests of Table 5; while
they indicate that in Italy, the least privileged type is significantly more risky
than the most privileged one, the difference in risk is not significant for Belgium
and the U.S.
It is instructive to visualize how these two components of inequality of oppor-
tunity shape in inequality of opportunity. The values of the two exact contribu-
tions are plotted against the values of the GO index in Figure 5. The positive
correlation which emerges from the inspection of both panels is rather impressive
and indicates that a good performance of a country according to equality of
opportunity is associated with reducing both return and risk inequality among
types.
5.3. Inequality of Opportunity vs. Inequality of Outcomes
We now examine the relationship between inequality of opportunity and
inequality of outcomes among countries. To do so, we use the Gini index and the
TABLE 6
Decompositions of the Gini Opportunity Index
GO
Exact Decomposition Pure Decomposition
GO Return GO Risk GO Return GO Risk GO residual
Belgium 4.58 4.14 0.43 5.06 0.45 -0.93
France 4.22 5.14 -0.91 6.79 -0.87 -1.70
Great Britain 3.45 3.65 -0.20 5.16 -0.25 -1.45
West Germany 0.88 1.98 -1.10 2.71 -1.06 -0.77
Italy 7.64 7.27 0.36 10.61 0.42 -3.40
Netherlands 2.97 3.07 -0.10 4.09 -0.09 -1.02
Norway 2.18 2.98 -0.80 3.82 -0.75 -0.88
Sweden 1.09 1.37 -0.28 1.67 -0.28 -0.30
U.S. 6.93 6.54 0.38 9.20 0.39 -2.67
Note: The exact decomposition corresponds to equation (8), while the pure decomposition cor-
responds to equation (7).
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Gini Opportunity index, since resorting to a cardinal measure of inequality makes
comparisons easier. The values of these indexes are presented in Table 7. Regard-
ing the extent of inequality of opportunity, three groups of countries stand out: a
first group composed of Sweden, Norway and West Germany, with the lowest
inequality of opportunity; an intermediate group composed of Belgium, France,
Great Britain and the Netherlands; and a group with high inequality of opportu-
nity composed of Italy and the U.S.
Figure 6 shows a positive correlation between inequality of opportunity and
inequality of outcomes. Sweden and Norway are the least unequal countries
according to both concepts, while the U.S. and Italy are the most unequal ones.
The correlation between inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcome is
of course far from perfect, but with these data the coefficient of correlation is
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Figure 5. Inequality of Opportunity, Inequality of Return and Inequality of Risk
TABLE 7
Index of Inequality of Opportunity (GO) and Inequality of
Outcome (Gini)
GO Gini
Sweden 1.09 18.26
(0.606) (0.727)
Norway 2.18 21.50
(0.581) (0.516)
Belgium 4.58 18.85
(0.581) (0.516)
Netherlands 2.97 25.10
(0.415) (0.568)
France 4.22 25.09
(0.406) (0.430)
West Germany 0.88 25.83
(0.426) (0.943)
Great Britain 3.45 30.58
(0.683) (0.823)
Italy 7.64 32.98
(0.531) (0.680)
U.S. 6.93 30.43
(0.586) (0.743)
Note: Standard errors estimated by bootstrap in parentheses.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 54, Number 4, December 2008
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © International Association for Research in Income and Wealth 2008
539
estimated at 0.674.16 If we draw a line that joins the two polar cases, two groups of
outliers stand out: Belgium lies above the line, Great Britain and West Germany
are below. These special cases should not be overinterpreted because of the limi-
tations of the data for these three countries. Overall, the strong positive correlation
between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity indicated in Figure 6
confirms the conclusion of several recent papers that have provided evidence of a
negative link between intergenerational mobility and income inequality, for
instance Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Solon (2004).
If inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity seem to go hand in
hand, it may still be the case that equality of opportunity policy entails some cost
in terms of GDP per capita. If a country with high inequality of opportunity also
has a high GDP per capita, the welfare of the least advantaged type in this country
may be higher than in a country that exhibits both lower inequality of opportunity
and lower GDP per capita. This kind of phenomenon cannot be detected by our
measure of inequality of opportunity since the opportunity set of a type is nor-
malized to the mean income. Hence, it does not take into account differences
across countries in the level of well-being reached by each type. For this reason,
Figure 7 examines the relationship between equality of opportunity and living
standard. It suggests that there is no trade-off in our sample between per-capita
income and equality of opportunity, as illustrated for instance, by the case of Italy
and the U.S., which both display a large degree of inequality of opportunity and
stay at both ends of the income level spectrum. This sort of efficiency equality
trade-off has already been discussed in Bourguignon et al. (2007b).
16If we were to exclude the U.S. and Italy from our graph, very little dependence would have been
detected between the extent of inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity. The coefficient
would be estimated at 0.187. Of course the omission of these two large countries would have hampered
the study. This observation tells us that the positive correlation between the two concepts of inequality
may depend on which country is included in the sample.
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6. Conclusion
This paper provides an international comparison of the extent of inequality of
opportunity for income in nine developed countries. Our empirical analysis rests
on a definition of equality of opportunity which is an alternative to and weaker
than John Roemer’s definition. Whereas Roemer’s original definition requires that
the distributions of income conditional on type be identical across types; we define
equality of opportunity as a situation in which there is no unanimous preference
for one particular conditional distribution over any other among risk-averse indi-
viduals behind the veil of ignorance. We complement this ordinal comparison
by relying upon an original index of inequality of opportunities, derived from
the Gini inequality index, which can be decomposed into a risk and a return
component.
Using the statistical methodology of Davidson and Duclos (2000) for com-
paring Generalized Lorenz curves, we evaluate the hypothesis of equality of
opportunity by testing for second-order stochastic dominance across income dis-
tributions conditional on social background. Overall, we find considerable differ-
ences in the degree of inequality of opportunities across countries. There is only
one country—Sweden—for which the hypothesis of equal opportunities could not
be rejected. For Sweden, in fact, not even the strong (Roemerian) definition could
be rejected. The proposed Gini index of opportunities is the lowest for Sweden,
Norway and West Germany, and highest for Italy and the U.S. The primary
component of inequality of opportunity is the differences in average income
between types. Differences between types in the degree of risk play a smaller role
and, in most countries, they tend to slightly compensate for the differences in
returns. The Gini index of opportunities is positively, but imperfectly, correlated
(0.67) with the standard Gini coefficient for income inequality. Still, the analysis
highlights that inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity can sometimes
lead to different pictures. For instance France and the Netherlands experience a
similar level of inequality of income but the former country is much more unequal
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than the latter from the point of view of equality of opportunity; a similar situation
arises when comparing the U.S. andGreat Britain. This may reflect different policy
choices regarding what conception of equality to promote.
Obviously, more countries should be analyzed to obtain a more complete and
definite picture of the potential contrast or congruence between inequality of
outcome and inequality of opportunity in the developed world. Since the dominant
picture seems to be a rather strong correlation between inequality of outcomes and
inequality of opportunity, a further investigation into understanding in depth the
link between the mechanisms reducing or enhancing both types of inequality is
called for.
Appendix: Statistical Tests
The testing procedure has been developed in Davidson and Duclos (2000). It
can be applied to any order of stochastic dominance. In this appendix we illustrate
the case of second order stochastic dominance test. First, we estimate the Lorenz
or the General Lorenz curves with their non-parametric estimator. From a sample
of size NA, LA represents the estimated Lorenz curve of distribution A, and SA its
variance–covariance matrix. To compare the Lorenz curves of distributions A and
B, we compute the difference of the two estimated vectors, noted g = LA - LB.
Insofar as the distributions A and B are independent, the global variance-
covariance matrix is given by: S = SA + SB.
To test the equality of the Lorenz curves: the null hypothesis is given by H0:
g = 0. It is then possible to show (see for example, Beach and Davidson, 1983;
Davidson and Duclos, 2000) that under H0 the estimated vector γˆ is asymptoti-
cally normal, then:
ˆ , .γ ∼ N 0 Σ ΣA
A
B
BN N
+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
The asymptotic distribution of the statistic T1, under the null hypothesis of
equality:
T
N N
A
A
B
B
k1
1
2
= ′ +
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−
ˆ ˆ .γ γ χΣ Σ ∼
To test equality of the two Lorenz curves A and B, one only needs to compare
the value of the statistic T1 with a c2 at 5 or 1 percent.
To test relative dominance (i.e. LA dominates LB), the two hypotheses are
H0 :γ ∈ +k against H1:γ ∉ +k . The Wald test statistic with inequality constraints
has been developed by Kodde and Palm (1986) and Wolak (1989). The statistic T2
defined by:
T
k2
= −
∈ +
min
γ
γ γ

ˆ
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with ||x|| = x′S-1x. Kodde and Palm (1986) have demonstrated that T2 follow a
mixture of c2 distributions:
T w k k j cjj
k
2
2
0
∼ , ,−( ) ≥( )
=
∑ Σ Pr χ
where w(k, k - j, S) represents the probability that k - j elements of g be strictly
positive. The distribution of this mixture of c2 is not tabulated, but upper and
lower bounds of critical values are given in Kodde and Palm. It is possible, if lower
and upper bounds do not enable to conclude to estimate critical values of the
statistic T2 by a Monte-Carlo procedure.
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TABLE A2
Inequality Indexes for Disposable Income
Gini Sd Log Theil Coef Var P90/P10 P75/P25
Belgium 18.85 0.38 0.06 0.36 2.29 1.57
(0.52) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03)
France 25.09 0.47 0.11 0.53 2.96 1.73
(0.43) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02)
Great Britain 30.58 0.68 0.16 0.61 4.31 2.05
(0.82) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.20) (0.05)
West Germany 25.83 0.61 0.12 0.56 3.01 1.75
(0.94) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04)
Italy 32.98 0.68 0.19 0.67 4.76 2.18
(0.68) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.22) (0.04)
Netherlands 25.10 0.47 0.11 0.51 2.91 1.77
(0.57) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04)
Norway 21.50 0.41 0.09 0.50 2.34 1.55
(0.51) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04)
Sweden 18.26 0.52 0.06 0.34 2.20 1.46
(0.73) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03)
U.S. 30.43 0.64 0.16 0.61 4.31 2.11
(0.74) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.22) (0.06)
Notes: Sd Log, standard deviation of logs; Coef Var, coefficient of variation
Standard errors estimated by bootstrap (200 replications) in parentheses.
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